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It is not my purpose to consider exhaustively the question whether the
Treaty of Versailles authorizes the occupation of the Ruhr by the
Frenfh, a question which some time ago was raised by the British
Government, and one which prior to that time was made the subject
of protest by Germany. Recently, in a more or less popular article,1
I endeavored to sum up the contentions in the matter, and therein
expressed the definite opinion that thi occupation of the Ruhr by the
French was unauthorized by the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.
A recent comment2 reviews the question. The writer thereof comes to a
different conclusion from that which I expressed, and while, as I said, I.
do not intend to consider the question exhaustively, I submit some
observations on the editorial comment mentioned. Paragraphs 17 and
18 of Annex-II, Part VIII, of the Treaty of Versailles read as follows:
"17. In case of default by Germany in the performance of any
obligation under this Part: of the present Treaty, the Commission will
forthwith give notice of such'default to each of the interested Powers
and may make such recommendations as to the action to be taken in
consequence of such default as it may think necessary."
"i8. The measures which the Allied and Associated Powers shall
have the right to take, in case of voluntary default by Germany, and
which Germany agrees not to regard as acts of war, may include eco-
nomic and financial prohibitions and reprisals and in general such other
measures as the respective Governments may determine to be necessary
in the circumstances."
There is no doubt that the Reparation Commission has declared
Germany in voluntary default within the meaning of this Paragraph 18.
The occupation of the Ruhr was participated in by France and
Belgium, and technically also by Italy.3 The first point made against
the occupation has beerl that even if such an occupation were permitted
by the Treaty, it could not-be applied except by the Allies as a whole, or
at least by the "interested Powers" to whom notice of default is to be
given under Paragraph 17. If -the contention be that the words
"respective Governments" mean any one of the "interested Powers"
acting by itself, we are led to very extraordinary conclusions as to what
'Is the Occupation of the Ruhr Legal? The New York Evening Post, August
21, 1923.
'Finch, The Legality of the Occupation of the Ruhr Valley, 17 Am. Joua. INT.
L. 724-733.
'The French note of Jafnuary IO, 1923, contained this expression: "The Italian
Government has also decided that Italian engineers shall participate." (Current
History, February, 1923, p. 718.) See, however, the Italian note of August 2,
1923, and the speech of Mussolini of November 18, 1923, as reported in the New
York Times of the following day.
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might legally happen.' In the present case we have France and
-Belgium actirig together, with perhaps Italy; the British hold aloof.
Very serious and complicated questions have arisen even from this fact,
owing to the continued occupation by the British of part of the Rhine-
land and the necessary British control of communications around
Cologne.5
However, if the interpretation of the permissibility of single action be
admitted to its full extent, there might result a situation of affairs so
extraordinary as to be impossible. Different Allied governments might
decide to take separate measures which conflicted with one another.
What would the legal situation be then? As Sir John Simon has
pointed out, suppose that one power decided to blockade Hamburg, and
another to collect customs duties there. What would Germany's duty
be in such a case,-to facilitate the collection of customs duties and thus
oppose the blockade, or to facilitate the blockade and thus prevent the
collection of customs duties? It could hardly be contended that it was
Germany's duty to do both.6
" There is no doubt that in general the Treaty of Versailles contemplates thai
action thereunder by the Allied and Associated Governments is to be taken by
"common accord." Compare the commend of Holland (The European Concert
in the Eastern Question, 221) regarding the rights of the Powers in relation to
the eastern question under the Treaties of Paris and Berlin. See also the decision
of the Arbitrator of a case under the General Act of Berlin of June 14, 189%,
mentioned in Crandall, Treaties (2d ed. 1916) 385.
'See in this connection the London Times Cologne dispatch printed in the New
York Times of January 16, 1924.
'The comment of Sir John Simon on this point is so valuable that I reproduce
it in full from The London Times of August 17, 1923:
"(I) Paragraph I8 consists of a single sentence which describes 'the measures
which the Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right to take in case of
voluntary default by Germany.' This expression 'the Allied7 and Associated
Powers' appears again and again in the Treaty, and everywhere it is used to
describe a single body, acting together. Thus, the Treaty itself is a Treaty
between the Allied and Associated Powers 'of the one part' and Germany 'of
tho other part.' It would be strange if a sentence which sets out to define the
measures which the body of Allies may take should end by authorizing the
invasion of Germany by one Allied Power without regard to the views of others."
"(2) Part VIII of the Treaty confers upon the Reparation Commission
authority to act on behalf of the Allies and gives it 'wide latitude as to its control
and handling of the whole reparation problem as dealt with in this Part of the
present Treaty.' If the contention of France is correct, the views of the Com-
mission, as representing the Allied body, might be completely disregarded by a
single Government acting alone."
"(3) Some only of the Allied and Associated Powers are interested in repara-
tions, and by Paragraph 17, in the case of Germanys default, the Reparation
Commission is to give notice of such default 'to each -f the interested Powers.'
When Paragraph x8 goes on to provide that in case of voluntary default, the
measures which the Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right to tale
include 'economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals, and in general such
other measures as the respective Governments may determine to be necessary in
the circumstances,' surely 'respective Governments' mean the Governments of the
interested powers, whose joint determination is then put in force by or on behalf
of the Allies as a whole. Any other view leads to the absurdity that each inter-
ested Power may determine the matter for itself, with the result that contra-
dictory courses may be decided upon, all of which have to be followed by the
body of Allies at the same time."
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As the view that the Treaty permits separate and conflicting actions
by different Powers against Germany leads to an absurdity, it is opposed
to an elementary rule of construction, thus stated by Vattel :7
"Every interpretation that leads to an absurdity ought to be rejected."
Indeed, as Sir John Simon remarked in the letter above mentioned:
"Principles of construction. . . . are nothing more than considerations
of good sense."
The writer in The American Journal of International Law seems to
think that because the British, acting alone, relinquished any right to
seize the property of German nationals in Great Britain in the case of
voluntary default by Germany, the British Government is "estopped"
from supporting the German contention on the foregoing point. Of
course, if there were such an estoppel, it would have not the slightest
bearing on the rights of Germany under the Treaty. There is, how-
ever, no such estoppel. The right to seize the property of German
nationals in Great Britain is a.right which can be exercised only by the
British Government; it is a right which is exercisable only on British
territory; consequently, and of course, if and when the British Govern-
ment decides that such a right shall not be exercised, that is an end of
the matter under any possible construction of the Treaty; for even if
the Treaty requires the joint action or agreement of the interested
Allies under Paragraph i8, there could be no such joint action or agred-
ment without the consent of the British Government.
The main question, however, is whether the occupation of the Ruhr
is authorized by the Treaty at all, the German claim being that the
Treaty of Versailles does not admit any territorial sanctions. As the
writer in The American Journal of International Law remarked, there
is consequently a difference of opinion as to the meaning of the Treaty.
I point out that this difference of opinion, whatever may be or may
have been the views of the British Government, is a difference of opinion
between Germany on the one hand and the Allied Powers (or some of
them) on the other. This is a question which, if not determined by
consent of the parties, is to be determined by a resort to the rules of
"(4) If, when Germany makes default in reparation payments, in which
Britain and Italy are interested as well as France and Belgium, one Power can
invade Germany on its own account, so can each of the others. Not only so, but
the action taken by one Power may nullify the action taken by another. For
example, one Power might impose blockade, while another Power claimed to
collect Customs duties at German ports. All this seems wholly contrary to the
general scheme of the Treaty, which contemplates that the Allies shall act
together. Indeed (to quote the language of the Note addressed by M. Clemen-
ceau to Rumania on August 23, i919), 'it is obvious that if the collection of
reparations were to be allowed to degenerate into individual and competitive
action by the several Allied and Associated Powers, injustice would be done and
cupidity aroused, and, in the confusion of unco~rdinated action, the enemy would
either evade or be incapacitated from making the maximum of reparation.'"
':2 Vattel, Law of Nations (Carnegie Inst. ed. 1916) sec. 282; (Chitty's ed.
1853) 251.
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interpretation and construction which are applicable; in other words, the
scientific grounds provided by jurisprudence.8
As introduction to the discussion, it is well to remember that the terms
of the Treaty of Versailles were entirely drafted by the Allied and
Associated Powers and were presented to Germany as thus written. In
this connection, I refer to one of the elementary and universal rules of
jurisprudence which has perhaps been nowhere better stated than by
VattelO as follows:
"In case of doubt, the interpretation goes against him who prescribed
the terms of the treaty: for as it was in some measure dictated by him,
it was his own fault if he neglected to express himself more clearly: and
by extending or restricting the signification of the expressions to that
meaning which is least favourable to him, we either do him no injury,
or we only do him that to which he has wilfully exposed himself;
whereas, by adopting a contrary mode of interpretation, we would incur
the risk of converting vague or ambiguous terms into so many snares
to entrap the weaker party in the contract, who has been obliged to
subscribe to what the stronger had dictated."
Any right to occupy the Ruhr under Paragraph 18 above quoted rests
on the last words of that Paragraph:
".... and in general such other measures as the respective Govern-
ments may determine to be necessary in the circumstances."
I shall later on have something to say about the rule of ejusdem
generis in connection with the construction of this language of the
Treaty; but I point out here that it is only by completely iguoring legal
history that one can suppose, as does the writer in The American
Journal of International Law, that this rule "was originated by Lord
Tenterden." Lord Tenterden applied the rule in 1827 in a case often
cited,10 but before that date the rule was familiar law under its name
of ejusdern generis as earlier cases show ;"1 and as a rule of construction
it is very ancient. Indeed, Lord Tenterden himself must have deemed
the rule an old one; for in the case cited, he applied it in the construc-
tion of two statutes of the seventeenth century.
In English law, the rule goes back at least to Coke :12
"When the statute speaks of dissolution, renouncing, relinfquishing,
forfeiture, giving up, etc. which are inferior means, by which such
religious houses came to the King, then the said latter words 'or by any
' 1 Oppenheim, International Law (3d ed. 1920) 700.
°4 Vattel, op. cit. supra note 7, sec. 32; (Chitty's ed. 1853) 443; see Bacon, Ele-
ments of the Common Law of England (i63o) Regula IIl.1°Sandiman v. Breach (I827,'K. B.) 7 B. & C. 96.
"1 Thompson v. Lady Lawley (1800, C. P.) 2 B. & P. 303, 309; Rex v. Joseph
Norris (x8o4, Cr. Gas.) Rus. and R. 69; Stuart v. The Marquis of Bute (i8o6,
Ch.) Ii Ves. Jr. 657; Rawlings v. Jennings (i8o6, Ch.) 13 Ves. Jr. 39, 45;
Hotham v. Sutton (i8o8, Ch.) i5 Ves. Jr. 319; Butler v. Wildman (i82O, K. B.)
3 Barn, and Ald. 398; Phillips v. Barber (1821, K. B.) 5 Barn. and Ald. x6r.
" Archbishop.of Canterbury's Case (I596) Part II, Coke 46a; see i Blackstone,
Commentaries (1852) 88.
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other means' cannot be intended of an Act of Parliament: which is the
highest manner of conveyance that can be; and therefore the makers
of the Act would have'put that in the beginning, and not in the end, after
other inferior conveyances, if they intended to extend the Act thereunto.
But these words 'by any other means' are to be so expounded, scil. by
any .other such inferior means. As it hath been adjudgd, that bishops
are not included within the statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 1o., for the statute
beginneth with colleges, deans and chapters, parsons, vicars, and
concludes with these words, 'and others having spiritual promotions';
these latter words do not include bishops, causa qua supra. So the
statute of WeAt. 2. cap. 41, the words which are, statuit Rex, quod si
abbates, priores, - custodes hospital' & aliarum domorpm religiosarum,
&c. These latter words do not include bishops, as it is holden i and 2
Phil. and Mary, Dyer, ioo.io9. for the cause aforesaid."
In the construction of treaties, as in the construction of other written
agreements and papers of various kinds, the main problem is to find out
the intent of those, or, as in the case of a will, of that one, who used
the language. The rules which have grown up about this problem in
the course of centuries are rules which are intended to aid in solving it.
They are not to be applied arbitrarily, but only according to the circum-
stances and the language of the particular document, keeping always in
view the main question of intent.
A peculiar branch of difficulty arise in connection with certain words
that are sometimes called general words. I refer to such words as "all,"
"other," "every," "always,' etc. Standing alone, in what one may
call a dictionary sense, each of these words has quite a definite and
precise meaning. But ordinarily words do not stand alone in a paper.
They are uged in groups; and it is a matter of common knowledge, and
has been a matter of common knowledge for centuries, that such general
words as I have mentioned, when used in sentences, are often used in a
sense other than what I have called their dictionary sense, that is to
say, in a loose or restricted sense. Now it has been found as a matter
of common sense that when a -question arises as to the meaning of a
particular word or particular words. in a paper,. it is often very helpful
to look at other words near by, which we may call neighboring words,
which is a part of the common sense idea of looking at the context.
This. rule of neighboring words is called noscitur a sociis. Of course,
this rule is no more conclusive than 4ny other rule; but it is often
helpful in solving the problem of intent, because in many cases a word
which, standing -alone, might mean any one of three or four things,
obviouslyby reference to neighboring words or to the context generally,
can mean only one thing. "Tfe rule of ejusdem generis is only a sub
division of the noscitur a sociis rulei---part of the idea of looking at the
context which indeed is itself a part of the universal principle that in
trying to find out the meaning and intent of any part of a paper, we
s'i Pope, Legal Definitions (i919) 449; Broom, Legal Maxims (8th ed. 1911)
447.
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must look at the whole paper, whether it be a will, a private agreement
or a treaty. Accordingly, it is not necessary to go into a'detailed review
of cases applying the rule of ejusdem generis. Contrary to the state-
ment in The American Journal of International Law, the rule is, of
course, in a proper case, applied to treaties ;14 and while the point is of
little consequence, I do not agree that there is any "moder tendency".
in the application of the rule to the word "other."'15  It is 'also
erroneous to think that the "rule has but little, if any, value in the
interpretation of statutes conferring discretionary powers on the judi-
ciary or public functionaries."' 6  I repeat that the rule of ejusdem.
generis is only one of the rules of construction, and that, of course, like
every other rule of construction, it never fias an arbitrary application. 7
It is a part of a general principle of common sense of looking at every-
thing that was written and not only at part of what was written, and
whether in any particular case the rule is or is not to be applied is a
matter of reason and judgment in that very case. A host of authorities
might be cited to' show hoW ancient almost all the modem principles and
rules of construction ire, including this rule of ejusdem generis.'8
I now refer to two cases in the Supreme Court of the United States
relating to treaties. In Fabre v. United States" the Court wascalled
upon to construe the words "other countries" in Article VIII of the
Commercial Convention of 1903 with Cuba, the question being whetler
' See discussion infra and cases cited; .see also 2 Vattel, op. cit. sec. 27o;
(Chitty's ed. 1853) 247, 8.
"This idea of a "modern tendency" is doubtless based on an expression of the
Master of the Rolls in a case of a post-nuptial settlement where the question' of
construction concerned a demise by a husband for the benefit of his wife;
Anderson v. Anderson [1895] 1 Q. B. 749, 752. That no such "modern tendency"
exists in England is shown by a case in the Court of Appeals in i9o8 which
reviews at length the Anderson case and numerous other English cases, Tillmans
& Co. v. SS. Knutsford, Ltd. [xgo8] 2 K. B. 385 (affirmed in the House of Lords
[i9o8] A. C. 406). In that case, the rule was applied to the words "or any other
cause," and one of the judges cited cases which, he said at page 401, "go to show
that the true rule is that the restricted meaning is the one which primarily
applies." The whole discussion of the subject in the case cited is illuminating.
A long list of American cases will be found in ig C. J. i225.
"The statement to this effect in The American Journal of International Law
is quoted from 2 Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 1267. The two cases dited by
Stroud for his statement do not support the view.
"A curious illustration of this principle may be found in a case in the Court
of Appdal (S. S. Magnhild v. McIntyre Brothers & Co. [1921] 2 K B. 97).
In discussing two expressions in the same clause of 'a charter party, one of the
Judges said (pp. 1o3, xos) that the ejusdem generis rule did not apply to one of
those expressions ("or other accident") but that the rule "should be strictly
applied" to the other expression ("or otherwise").
12 Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace (Campbell's transl. 1814) 155; 1
Digest of Justinian (Monroe's transl. 19o4) Title III, 2% 21; Bacon, Elements
of the Common Law of England, Regula III.
(1911) 22I U. S. 649, 31 Sup. Ct. 659.
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the Philippine Islands were or were not within this expression "other
countries." Obviously, the Philippine Islands, under a broad use of
the word "other," may very properly be said to constitute a country
"other" than the United States, just as they may be said to -constitute
a country "other" than Cuba. -The Court first examined the question
in the light of United States Statute Law and decisions; recognizing,
however, that United States Statutes and decisions might not be conclu-
sive on the understanding of Cuba as to the meaning of the treaty, the
Court then went on to look at the context, and found in that context the
word "imports"; and because of this word "imports" the Court gave
a restricted meaning to the words "other countries" and excluded the
Philippine Islands therefrom. The discussion on this point is at pages
659 and 66o of the opinion, and is very illuminating. Here is a
restricted construction of the word "other" in a treaty, announced by
one of the highest authorities in questions of international law. It is a
modern case, and a very strong case on the qu.estion of construction,
for the reason that it finds a restricted construction of the word
"other," not even from preceding particular expressions, but merely
from one preceding word--"imports." Of course the rule of construc-
tion applied in this case by the Supreme Court of the United States here
goes farther even than the rule of ejusdem generis.
Let us look at another treaty case in the Supreme Court of the United
States, United States v. Percheman.20  The case turned upon a proper
construction of the treaty of 1819 between the United States and Spain
and the opinion was delivered by Chief Justice Marshall. In construing
the clause of cession in the treaty, Marshall wrote as follows :21
"The language of the second article conforms to. this general
principle: 'His Catholic Majesty cedes to the United States in full
property and sovereignty, all the territories which belong to Rim, situated
to the eastward of the Mississippi, by the name of East and West
Florida.' A cession of territory is never understood to be a cession of
the property belonging to its inhabitants. The king cedes that only
which belonged to him; lands he had previously granted, were not his
to cede. Neither party could so understand the cession; neither party
could consider itself as attempting a wrong to individuals, condemned
by the practice of the whole civilized world. The cession of a territory,
by its name, from one sovereign to another, conveying the compound
idea of surrendering at the same time the lands and the people who
inhabit them, would be necessarily understood to pass the sovereignty
only, and not to interfere with private property. If this could be
doubted, the doubt would be removed by the particular enumeration
which follows: 'The adjacent island, dependent on said provinces, all
public lots and squares, vacant lands, public edifices, fortifications,
barracks and other buildings which are not private property, archives
and documents -which relate directly to the property and sovereignty of
the said provinces, are included in this article.' This special enumera-
tion could not have been made, had the first clause of the article been
so (1833, U. S.) 7 Pet. 51.
' Supra note 2o, at p. 87.
THE OCCUPATION OF THE RUHR 53
supposed tb pass not only the objects thus enumerated, but private
property also. The grant of buildings could not have been limited by
the words 'which are not pri-ate property,' had private property been
included in the cession of the territory." (Italics mine.)
In other words, Marshall said, first, that under the general principles
of international law the sweeping language of the treaty which he quotes
would not pass the property belonging to the inhabitants of the ceded
territory. Then he goes on to say, in effect, that even if this general
principle of international law does not apply, the rule of ejusdem generis
does, and that the general description is limited by what he calls "the
particular enumeration." *A clearer statement of the applicability of
this rule to a treaty could hardly be made than was made by Chief
Justice Marshall.
Now let us look at the Treaty of Versailles and see from it the mean-
ing of Paragraph i8 above quoted. If the language of that Paragraph
is is to be given the French interpretation, it means that by two words
"other measures" the Allies had the right under the Treaty to occupy
the whole of Germany upon Germany's default in the payment of
money. Now I point out that such an interpretation makes the previous
language in this Paragraph i8 meaningless. Of course, it is not to be
supposed that the Allies were doing a vain thing when they wrote the
words "economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals," but the
broad interpretation suggested for the words "other measures" would
render these-previous words of not the remotest consequence. If the
Treaty in two words says that the Allies can do anything at all, why say
they may take economic measures, and why say that they may take finan-
cial measures, of prohibitions and reprisals? This Paragraph is
mentions four particular measures which the Allies may take, namely,
economic prohibitions, financial prohibitions, economic reprisals and
financial reprisals. 22 Why are these four measures mentioned if the
words of mention do not have the slightest effect whatever? Why, I
ask, did M. Klotz request to have the word "financial" put into this
paragraph if it already included the whole dictionary?
It is to be pointed out that this Paragraph is is a paragraph of an
Annex to Part VIII of the Treaty, and, in general, this Annex relates
to the powers of the Reparation Commission. Indeed, one of these
powers of the Reparation Commission is to make recommendations as
to the actions to be taken under Paragraph is (see Paragraph 17). It
is not to be, upposed that the actions to be taken under Paragraph i8 are
any different in character, or any greater in degree, than the actions
which might be recommended under Paragraph 17 by the Reparation
Commission; and certainly, the recommendations to be made by the
2, The words "economic and financial" qualify the word "reprisals" as well as
the word "prohibitions." I think this would be so if the English text stood alone,
but the French text "de prohibitions et de repr~sailles 6conomiques et financi~res"
makes it unquestionable.
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Reparation Commission are very naturally to be economic and financial
recommendations, and not political rec6mmendations. The whole duties
of the Reparation Commission are economic and financial. The whole
Annex, and, indeed, the whole part of the Treaty to which it is an
annex, relates to economic and financial matters: such provisions as
that for the determination of Germany's capacity to pay, for the issuance
of bonds, for the acceptance of payment in kind, illustrate this point;
the Commission, under -Paragraph i2, has a wide latitude as to its
control of handling the whole reparation problem. It is an economic
and financial body.
It may indeed well. be argued that without resort to any rule of
construction and under the precise words of the Treaty, the occupation
of the Ruhr by the French is unauthorized by the Tteaty. It is specifi-
cally prbvided in Paragraph 12 of this Annex 2 that the Reparation
Commission "shall have authority to interpret its provisions," that is to
say, the provisions of "this 'Part" of the present Treaty which is
Part VIII, and which ificludes the Annex 2 of which Paragraph i8
above .quoted is one paragraph. I note incidentally that by Paragraph
ii, in coming to .decisions the Reparation Commission shall be guided
"by justice, equity and good faith." Now turning to Paragraph 13, we
find the rules of voting in the Commission. In general, the Commission
decides by a majority vote,23 but on certain specified questions, "una-
nimity is necessary." One of these questions is sub-division of Para-
graph 13, which reads as-follows: "Questions of the interpretation of
the provisions of this Part of the present Treaty."
Now the British Government and its representative on the Repara-
tion Commission, as well as the German Government, have dissented
from the view .that under Paragraph i8, which is one of the paragraphs
which the Reparation Commission has express authority to interpret,
the French can go into the Ruhr. Accordingly, there has not yet been
any interpretation of this paragraph of the Treaty by the Reparation
Commission. In a case such as this, when the interpretation of a
treaty is in dispute, and where the body which has been given,.the right
'to interpret a particular paragraph of the Treaty has not interpreted it,
it cannot be supposed that each one of the Powers having different views
may proceed according to its own interpretation. Such a construction
again might lead to contradictory and perhaps impossible results.
Moreover, it cannot be said that these provisions for the interpretation
of this part .f the Treaty by the Reparation Commission are provisions
merely for the benefit of the Allies. They are provisions for the benefit
of the Allies and for the benefit of Germany as well, because they are
in a Treaty which binds Germany; and Gei-many has the right to insist
that there be an interpretation of this Treaty in accordance with its
terms before any action is taken under a disputed clause of the Treaty.
'Thus, a majority vote of the Commission is sufficient to declare Germany in
voluntary default.
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In this connection it may be well to quote the remarks of the Allied
Powers in regard to the Reparation Commission generally.
I quote from the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers included
with M. Clemenceau's letter bf June i6, 1919, under the heading Part
VIII-Reparation:
"In short the observations of the German Delegation present a view
of this Commission so distorted and so inexact that it is difficult to
believe that the clauses of the Treaty have been calmly or carefully
examined. It is not an engine of oppression or a device for interfering
with German sovereignty. It has no forces at its command; it has no
executive powers within the territory of Germany; it cannot, as is
suggested, direct or control the educational or other systems of the
country. Its business is to fix what is to be paid; to satisfy itself that
Germany can pay; and to report to the Powers, whose Delegation it is,
in case Germany makes default. If Germany raises the money required
in her own way, the Commission cannot order that it shall be raised in
some other way; if Germany offers payment in kind, the Commission
may accept such payment, but, except as specified in the Treaty itself,
the Commission cannot require such a payment."
Let us look still further, however, at the question of construction,
aside from the powers of- -interpretation given to the Reparation Com-
mission. The broad construction of the two words "other measures"
would not only exclude the prior words of Paragraph 18 from having
any meaning in the Treaty, but would, in effect, to a large extent, make
superfluous the territorial guarantees of Part XIV of the Treaty.
Article 430, for example, relates to a finding by the Reparation Com-
mission under Paragraph 7 of Annex 2 of Part VIII, and it says that
if the Reparation Commission makes such a finding, any part of the
Rhineland which has been evacuated may be reoccupied. Article 430
does not give this right of reoccupation of the Rhineland except in
regard to Germany's refusal to execute the Treaty in respect of repara-
tions. Clearly, this Article is a superfluous piece of writing if the
matter was already covered by two words in Paragraph 18 of Annex 2
of Part VIII. It is not a question, as the writer in The American
Journal of International Law seems to think, of restricting one para-
graph of the Treaty by looking at another. The question is to detr-
mine the meaning of the whole Treaty by looking at it all, and to look
at it all so as to give effect to all of it; not to make some of it super-
fluous and unnecessary.
The writer in The American Journal of International Law cites indi-
rectly, through a State Department note, a remark of Vattel to the effect
that the interpretation which would render a treaty null cannot be
admitted. To say that the interpretation of a treaty which restricts the
occupation of German territory to that in-which are only seven millions
of- Germans instead of territory in which there are eleven millions
renders it null, is to use language which I do not comprehend. How-
ever, as the writer relies upon Vattel, I refer here to a few of the expres-
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sions of Vattel concerning what are called "odious" 24 provisions in a
treaty:
"" " " " everything that is not for the common advantage, everything
that tends to destroy the equality of a contract, everything that onerates
only one of the parties, or that onerates the one more than the other, is
odious.... "
..... Everything that contains a penalty is odious...
".... although neither absurdity nor injustice results from the pr6per
meaning of the terms--if, nevertheless, manifest equity or a great
common advantage requires their restriction, we ought to adhere to the
most limited sense which the proper signification will admit, even in an
affair that appears favourable in its own nature, * "
cc. ... we should, when there is question of odious things, interpret
the terms in the most limited sense: we may even to a certain degree
adopt a figurative meaning, in order to avert the oppressive conse-
quences of the proper and literal sense, or any thing of an odious nature,
which it would involve: ...."25
I quote also from Grotius on the same point:
".... Treaties of an odious kind are those which lay greater burdens
on one party than on the other, which contain penalties for non-per-
formance, or which lead to an abrogation or infraction of former
treaties .... "26
The writer in The American Journal of International Law mentions
the views of M. Tardieu in this matter. The eminent position of M.
Tardieu is familiar to all and no one has more respect for him and for
his views than I; but the opinion of any framer of the Treaty is not
here conclusive of a legal question. If it were, I could cite as against
the view of M. Tardieu the expressions of one who had an even greater
part than he in making the Treaty ;17 in my opinion, however, the discus-
sion is not advanced by such expressions on either side. Looking at
the whole Treaty, it seems clear to me that the words "and in general
such other measures as the respective Governments may determine to be
necessary in the circumstances" should properly be construed only to
include such other measures as are similar to those of the preceding
enumeration. For this case, I think we may rightly adopt the words
" While this word "odious" is not now in common use in reference to treaties,
the principles of the older writers in connection with it are recognized by the
later authorities. For example; one leading authority states that: "whenever, or
in so far as a state does not contract itself out of its fundamental legal rights by
express language, a treaty must be so construed as to give effect to those rights.
Thus, for example, no treaty can be taken to restrict by implication the exercise of
rights of sovereignty or property or self-preservation. Any restriction of such
rights must be effected in a clear and distinct manner..... Hall, International
Law (7th ed. 1917) 348. See also the reasoning of the decision in The North
Atlantic Fisheries Case, 4 Am. JOUR. INT. L., 956, 958.
=2 Vattel, op. cit. supra note 7, secs. 299-308; (Chitty's ed. 1853) 263-7.
2aGrotius, op. cit. supra note 18, 149.
' I refer to Woodrow Wilson and his Armistice Day address reported in the
New York Times of November i, 1923.
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of a case in the House of Lords: "When a specific enumeration
concludes with a geneial term, that term is, by a well known canon of
construction, held to be limited to alia similia.1
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I confess my inability to comprehend an argument as to the meaning
of the Treaty based upon the practical interpretation thereof by the
Allies. It is news to me that an act by one party to an agreement,
which has been constantly denounced and disputed by the other party, is
a practical interpretation of an agreement. I never before heard of an
argument which would lead to the conclusion that the German invasioh
of Belgium in 1914 was a "practical interpretation" of the Treaty of
1839; and I point out here that the author in The American Journal of
International Law refers to the Protocol of Spa on July 16, 1920, as
signed by Germany, but omits the sigificant fact that it was signed by
Germany under reserve of Article 720 which is the very Article in the
Protocol which contains the words quoted by the writer regarding the
occupation of the Ruhr. An argument has been based by the writer
in The American Journal of International Law on the provisions of
Article 248 of the Treaty, reading as follows:
"Subject to such exceptions as the Reparation Commission may
approve, a first charge upon all the assets and revenues of the German
Empire and its constituent States shall be the cost of reparation and all
other costs arising under the present Treaty or any treaties or agree-
ments supplementary thereto or under arrangements concluded between
Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers during the Armistice
or its extensions ... "
The idea that this Article 248 has the slightest reference to territorial
sanctions has been answered, and has been answered conclusively and
officially by the Allies themselves. In the reply of the Allied and
Associated Powers transmitted to the German Government with the
note of M. Clemenceau, of June 16, I919, is contained the following
under the heading, Part IX, Financial Clauses, making specific reference
to Article 248:
". ... Within the Empire the Allied and Associated Powers have
claimed a charge only on the property and resources of the Empire and
the German states. Their right in this regard, resulting from the finan-
cial clauses, has been limited as far as possible, and an effort has been
made to avoid giving it any vexatious character. Finally, all excep-
tions compatiblM with the rights of the Allied and Associated Powers
have been granted, and these will permit the economic interests and
credit of Germany to be protected as far as possible.
In a word, in view of the burdens that Germany must assume, the
financial provisions adopted by the Allied and Associated Powers spare
the essential interests of Germany as far as possible.
"Lord Watson in Countess of Rothes v. Kirkcaldy Waterworks Commissioners
(1882, H. L.) L. R. 7, A. C. 694 at p. 706. The case turned on the language of
a Scotch statute and the Judge pointed out that that Statute did not contain a
"general 'term" such as the word "other."
"i6 Am. JouR. INT. L., Supplement, 2o5-2o6.
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i. The Allied and Associated Powers again assert their right to
obtain the payment of reparations and other charges resulting from the
Treaty, in priority to the settlement of all other debts of the Empire or
of the German States.
Nevertheless, they consider it proper to provide, in certain special
cases, for the granting of exceptions to the general principle thus laid
down, and they are ready to insert at the beginning of Article 248 the
following sentence:
'Subject to such exceptions as the Reparation Commission may
approve a first charge.'
This new stipulation will permit measures to be taken with a view
to protecting Germany's credit as far as possible."
It is, of course, made certain by this language that the provisions in
Article 248 were intended merely to provide for the payment of repara-
tions and other Treaty charges in priority to the debts of Germany and
of the States of Germany. It is nearly five years too late to claim that
Article 248 has other meaning.
The author in The American Journal of International Law mentions
the declaration signed by Mr. Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and M.
Clemenceau, on June 16, 1919, published by Mr. Baker,80 and says that
this declaration "appears to have been the result of French dissatisfac-
tion -with the guarantee clauses."
No authority is cited for this statement, and it is directly contrary to
all the known evidence on the subject. Baker says about it that the
declaration was suggested by Mr. Wilson on June 12 for the purpose of
"getting out of the threatening impasse between Lloyd George and
Clemenceau.31 He adds that it "satisfied neither the British, for whom
it was too mild, nor the French, for whom it was too strong." Then
he makes this important statement:
"Some of its terms were known, however, and made Poincar6 rage
and attack Clemenceau for betraying France to Lloyd George."
It would be interesting to know the basis for the statement in The
American Journal of International Law .that this declaration was the
"result of French dissatisfaction with the guarantee clauses," for the
declaration, so far as it goes, weakens these very clauses. Finally, if
there could remain any doubt as to whether the Treaty ought to be
interpreted in favor of the occupation of the Ruhr or against it, I refer
to the fact that there is an official basis for the construction of this
.Treaty, which does not ordinarily exist in the rase of treaties. This
basis of construction was stated by the Allied Powers in their reply to
Germany included in the note of M. Clemenceatt of June 16, i919, which
I have mentioned above, and reads as follows:
302 Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, 117. Mr. Baker is mis-
taken in thinking that the declaration was published for the first time by him.
It was printed in 1919 by the British Government as Command 24D.
I Supra note 28, at p. i16.
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"The Allied and Associated Powers are in complete accord with the
German Delegation in their insistence that the basis for the negotiation
of the Treaty of Peace is to be found in the correspondence which
immediately preceded the signing of the Armistice on November II,
1918. It was there agreed that the Treaty of Peace should be based on
the Fourteen Points of President Wilson's address of January 8, 1918,
as they were modified by the Allies' memorandum included in the Presi-
dent's note of November 5, 1918; and upon the principles of settlement
enunciated by President Wilson in his later addresses, and particularly
in his address on September 27, 1918. These are the principles upon
which" hostilities were abandoned in November, 1918, these are the
principles upon which the Allied and Associated Powers agreed that
peace might be based, these are the principles which have guided them
in the deliberations which have led to the formulation of the Conditions
of Peace."
So if there is still any doubt in this matter as to how the Treaty should
be construed, and I do not think there is, we have simply to ask the
question as to whether the occupation of the Ruhr by the French is in
accordance with the principles and declarations of President Wilson.
I need not cite any of these at length except the following'expressions
from the above mentioned speech of September 27, 1918:
"Shall the military power of any nation or group of nations be
suffered to determine the fortunes of peoples over whom they have no
right to rule except the right of force?
"Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations and make them
subject to their purpose and interests?
"Shall peoples be ruled and dominated, even in their own internal
affairs, by arbitrary and irresponsible force or by their own will and
choice?
"Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all
peoples and nations or shall the strong do as they will and the weak
suffer without redress ?"
